Mobilitie’s Increased Transparency is Somewhat Opaque

Back on May 27, 2016 Martha DeGrasse of RCR Wireless published a very interesting article titled, “Mobilitie to increase transparency for jurisdictions”.  It’s well worth going back to (re)read her article about how Mobilitie’s President, Christos Karmis said his firm would use its own corporate name with local jurisdictions.

Huh? Use its own name? Why is this a big deal?

Well, this arose out of Mobilitie’s process of using “<INSERT THE STATE NAME> Utility Pole Authority” names with local governments.  Using the word “Authority” as an entity identification in government filings suggests that the entity is, itself, some sort of governmental agency. That’s made clear in Martha’s article.

With Mr. Karmis’s assurance back in May, many of us on the government side thought the hide-the-ball issue was resolved.

Fast forward two months after Martha’s article to July 28, 2016. That’s the date on a letter from Keenan Adamchak, legal counsel for a nifty new entity called “Pole & Fiber Network Authority ME, LLC”, addressed to the Maine Public Utilities Commission.

What did the July letter request on behalf of  the Pole & Fiber Network Authority ME, LLC?  The first paragraph of the letter sets out that

On behalf of Pole & Fiber Network Authority ME, LLC (“Pole & Fiber Network Authority ME,”
or the “Company”), transmitted herewith is the Company’s Application for Authority to Provide
Intrastate Local Exchange Telecommunications Service in the State of Maine.

I suppose Mobilitie, which set up Pole & Fiber Network Authority ME, LLC back in February, is still enamored with being called an Authority.  Given that local governments commonly ask for proof of state authority to operate in those local jurisdictions when an entity seeks local permits and authorizations, names really do count.

It’s my opinion that the Maine application, filed over two months after Mr. Karmis’s comments about transparency, suggests a parallel with another matter of public concern and interest where the words counted:

That’s my opinion. What’s yours?

Jonathan

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T-Mobile v. Roswell Decided: Both Got It Wrong

(Updated 1/21/15: see bottom)

This is a flash report on the Supreme Court decision announced today in T-Mobile v. Roswell penned by Justice Sotomayor.  A detailed analysis will follow.  For now, here is the Syllabus (not part of the decision) followed by a link to the 28-page decision.  The big takeaway: A City need not include any or every reason for denial in the denial letter, but it must make the record and reasons for denial available essentially contemporaneously with the written decision.  Waiting 26 days to issue the reasons for denial after the denial was determined was too long a period.  Justice Alito issued a concurring opinion. CJ Roberts joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Thomas, dissented in various parts.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC v. CITY OF ROSWELL, GEORGIA
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–975. Argued November 10, 2014—Decided January 14, 2015

Respondent Roswell’s city council (Council) held a public hearing to consider an application by petitioner T-Mobile South, LLC, to build a cell phone tower on residential property. During the hearing, several Council members expressed concerns about the tower’s impact on the area. The hearing ended with the Council unanimously passing a motion to deny the application. Two days later, the City’s Planning and Zoning Division informed petitioner by letter that the application had been denied and that minutes from the hearing would be made available. The detailed minutes were published 26 days later.

Petitioner filed suit, alleging that the Council’s denial was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The District Court agreed, concluding that the City, by failing to issue a written decision stating its reasons for denying the application, had violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which provides that a locality’s denial “shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” 47 U. S. C. §332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The Eleventh Circuit, following its precedent, found that the Act’s requirements were satisfied here because petitioner had received a denial letter and possessed a transcript of the hearing that it arranged to have recorded.

Held:

1. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) requires localities to provide reasons when they deny applications to build cell phone towers. This conclusion follows from the Act’s provisions, which both preserve and specifically limit traditional state and local government authority. It would be considerably difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether a locality’s denial was “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” §332(c)(7)(B)(iii), or whether a locality had “unreasonably discriminate[d] among providers of functionally equivalent services,” §332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), or regulated siting “on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions,” §332(c)(7)(B)(iv), if localities were not obligated to state their reasons for denial. And nothing in the Act suggests that Congress meant to use the phrase “substantial evidence” as anything but an administrative law “term of art” that describes how “an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court.” United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709, 715. Pp. 6–8.

2. Localities are not required to provide their reasons for denying siting applications in the denial notice itself, but may state those reasons with sufficient clarity in some other written record issued essentially contemporaneously with the denial. Pp. 8–13.

(a) Nothing in the Act’s text imposes a requirement that the reasons be given in any particular form, and the Act’s saving clause, §332(c)(7)(A), makes clear that the only limitations imposed on local governments are those enumerated in the statute. Localities comply with their obligation to give written reasons so long as those reasons are stated clearly enough to enable judicial review. Because an adversely affected entity must decide whether to seek judicial review within 30 days from the date of the denial, §332(c)(7)(B)(v), and because a court cannot review the denial without knowing the locality’s reasons, the locality must provide or make available its written reasons at essentially the same time as it communicates its denial.Pp. 8–11.

(b) Petitioner’s contrary arguments are unavailing. The statute’s word “decision” does not connote a written document that itself provides all the reasons for a given judgment. The absence of the word “notify” in the provision at issue also does not signal an intention to require communication of more than a judgment. Nor does an obligation to provide reasons in the writing conveying the denial arise from the “substantial evidence” requirement itself or from the requirement of court review “on an expedited basis,” §332(c)(7)(B)(v). It is sufficient that a locality’s reasons be provided in a manner that is clear enough and prompt enough to enable judicial review. Pp. 11–13.

3. The City failed to comply with its statutory obligations under the Act. Although it issued its reasons in writing and did so in an acceptable form, it did not provide its written reasons essentially contemporaneously with its written denial when it issued detailed minutes 26 days after the date of the written denial and 4 days before expiration of petitioner’s time to seek judicial review. P. 14.

731 F. 3d 1213, reversed and remanded.

Here is the decision in full (28 pages, PDF format): tmobile.v.roswell.13-975_8n6a

Update: Catalina Lehner, the wireless planner par excellence at the City of Albuquerque reminded me that the big winners in this case were, as usual, the lawyers.  So true.

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Question for Rep. Don Parsons of Georgia

Yesterday I had the pleasure of speaking at LSI’s Deployment of Wireless Facilities Conference, held in Atlanta, Georgia.

I spoke on the FCC’s implementation of Section 6409(a) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (commonly but inaccurately called the “Spectrum Act,” a term that never appeared in the the MDTRJCA).  However, this post is not about my lecture, during which I raised some interesting questions for carriers and tower companies to ponder under the general heading of ‘be careful what you wish for.’

After I spoke, the next panel included the Honorable Don Parsons of the Georgia House of Representatives (R – Marietta, District 44).  Rep. Parsons was responsible for introducing and pushing Georgia House Bill 176, which he called The Broadband Infrastructure Leads to Development Act, or the BILD Act for short.

The BILD Act is Georgia’s version of a Super 6409(a) bill, containing the following introduction:

To amend Title 36 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to local government, so as to change certain provisions applicable to counties and municipal corporations related to advanced broadband collocation; to provide for a short title; to provide for definitions; to make changes related to streamlined processing; to standardize certain procedures related to 4
new wireless facilities; to place limitations on the time allowed for the review of new wireless facilities; to limit fees charged for review of wireless facilities; to provide for related matters; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.

One of the final provisions of the BILD Act contained this nugget:

36-66B-7. 170. A local governing authority shall not . . . [c]harge an applicant a zoning, permitting, or other fee for review or inspection of a collocation or modification in excess of $500.00. . .

I don’t know about your local government, but I don’t know of any local government that can properly accept, review, report, and decide a collocation application for the maximum fee of $500.00, including all inspection fees.

Essentially, Rep. Parson’s BILD Act shifted the cost of collocation applications and construction safety inspections to local governments, save for the first $500.00.  This means that instead of multi-billion dollar corporations and their shareholders bearing the cost of their for-profit cell site applications and safety inspections, Rep. Parson has shifted the bulk of that burden onto the backs of Georgia taxpayers.  That’s just peachy if you’re a wireless company, but not so peachy if you’re a Georgia taxpayer.

I wanted to ask Rep. Parson’s why he would give a multi-million dollar fee gift to the multi-billion dollar wireless industry at the expense of Georgia taxpayers, but time in his session ran out.  Perhaps someday I’ll have the opportunity to hear Rep. Parson’s reasons to favor the wireless industry and the (real) expense of his constituents.

Jonathan

 

 

 

 

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Permits? We’re AT&T and we don’t need no stinkin’ permits!

TreasuremadreDobbs: “If you’re the cell phone company where are your permits?”
Gold Hat: “Permits? We ain’t got no permits. We don’t need no permits! I don’t have to show you any stinkin’ permits!”     

     -with apologies to B. Traven and then John Huston

It seems that Ridgewood, New Jersey is non-to-happy with AT&T Wireless at the moment.

Can you guess why?

Well, according to a published report on NewJersey.com, it seems like AT&T Wireless decided that it would forgo actually pulling permits for a COW (Cell on Wheels) which it parked and then set up at a local gas station in town.

A portion of the NewJersey.com new report is telling. . .

According to AT&T’s public relations representative Ellen Webner, the tower, called a cell site on wheels or COW, is “in a temporary location while we work with the local community, zoning, on a permanent location.”

She did not comment when asked to explain why the village was not previously notified by AT&T about the tower.

“We are now working with the town through zoning and going through all proper procedures,” Webner said.

I enjoyed Ms. Webner’s use of the word “now” in that last sentence.

– Read the entire story at THIS LINK.  Opens in a new window.

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Missouri Cell Tower Industry Driven Laws Struck Down by Judge

Missouri Coat of Arms
Missouri Coat of Arms

According to a published reports, Cole County Circuit Judge Patricia Joyce has issued a permanent injunction and declared the two laws as being invalid.  This follows the preliminary injunction she issued on Aug. 27 staying the laws (HB 331) from taking effect as scheduled the next day.

Judge Joyce ruled that the HB 331 was flawed procedurally, by violating state constitutional provisions that bills contain only one subject that is clearly expressed in its title,  and that lawmakers cannot amend them to change a bills’ original purpose.

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/10/22/3704343/judge-strikes-down-mo-laws-on.html#storylink=cpy

This is great news for local governments in Missouri, which battled against ‘Super 6409 + Super Shot Clock’ rules promoted by AT&T on behalf of the wireless industry.  Hopefully the Missouri Attorney General’s office will not appeal the ruling.  It has until Dec. 2 to make that decision.

For more on HB 331, including the full text of the law, see THIS POST here at CellTowerSites.com.

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Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon Signs Wireless Siting Degreg Bill (HB 331) into Law

Missouri local government and their residents will now be largely silenced as to the placement of wireless towers in communities.

Missouri Coat of Arms
Missouri Coat of Arms

Yesterday, Gov. Jay Nixon signed HB 331, including its “UNIFORM WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT ACT” provisions.

HB 331 was lauded by the wireless  industry and strongly opposed by the Missouri Municipal League and many local governments.

Gov. Nixon’s office released a very brief statement on Friday saying that HB 331 and HB  345 together  “will provide the opportunity for expanded access and improved broadband and wireless service through more rapid deployment” of wireless and wired infrastructure.”

The Missouri Municipal League urged Gov. Nixon to veto HB 331, as did the  Missouri Association of Counties.

According to published reports, the Missouri Telecommunications Industry Association said the bill will “allow the industry to improve service more quickly and standardize a sometimes slow and plodding approval process.”

As summarized by the state legislature, the UNIFORM WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT ACT will have the following effects:

UNIFORM WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT ACT

The bill establishes the Uniform Wireless Communications
Infrastructure Deployment Act to encourage and streamline the
deployment of broadband facilities and to help ensure that robust
wireless communication services are available throughout Missouri.
The bill:
(1) Prohibits an authority as specified in the bill with
jurisdiction over wireless communications infrastructure from
taking specified actions that could result in a non-uniform market
for wireless service in Missouri. The prohibition does not include
state courts having jurisdiction over land use, planning, or zoning
decisions made by an authority. The prohibitions include:

(a) Requiring an applicant to submit information about or evaluate
an applicant’s business decisions with respect to its designed
service, customer demand for service, or quality of its service to
or from a particular area or site;

(b) Evaluating an application based on the availability of other
potential locations for the placement of wireless support
structures or wireless facilities including, without limitation,
the option to add wireless infrastructure to existing facilities
instead of constructing a new wireless support structure or for
substantial modifications of a support structure or vice versa;

(c) Dictating the type of wireless facilities, infrastructure, or
technology to be used by the applicant by requiring an applicant to
construct a distributed antenna system in lieu of constructing a
new wireless support structure;

(d) Requiring the removal of existing wireless support structures
or wireless facilities, wherever located, as a condition for
approval of an application;

(e) Imposing environmental testing, sampling, or monitoring
requirements or other compliance measures for radio frequency
emissions on wireless facilities that are categorically excluded
under the Federal Communications Commission’s rules for radio
frequency emissions under 47 CFR 1.1307(b)(1) or other applicable
federal law;

(f) Establishing or enforcing regulations or procedures for RF
signal strength or the adequacy of service quality;

(g) Rejecting an application in conformance with 47 U.S.C. Section
332(c)(7)(b)(4), in whole or in part, based on perceived or alleged
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions;

(h) Imposing any restrictions with respect to objects in navigable
airspace that are greater than or in conflict with the restrictions
imposed by the Federal Aviation Administration;

(i) Prohibiting the placement of emergency power systems that
comply with federal and state environmental requirements;

(j) Charging an application fee, consulting fee, or other fee
associated with the submission, review, processing, and approval of
an application that is not required for similar types of commercial
development within the authority’s jurisdiction. Fees imposed by
an authority for or directly by a third-party entity providing
review or technical consultation to the authority must be based on
actual, direct, and reasonable administrative costs incurred for
the review, processing, and approval of an application. In no case
should total charges and fees exceed $500 for a collocation
application or $1,500 for an application for a new wireless support
structure or for a substantial modification of a wireless support
structure. An entity with jurisdiction or any third-party entity
cannot include within its charges any travel expenses incurred in a
third-party’s review of an application, and in no event can an
applicant be required to pay or reimburse an authority for
consultation or other third-party fees based on a contingency or
result-based arrangement;

(k) Imposing surety requirements, including bonds, escrow
deposits, letters of credit, or any other type of financial surety,
to ensure that abandoned or unused facilities can be removed unless
the authority imposes similar requirements on other permits for
other types of commercial development or land uses;

(l) Conditioning the approval of an application on the applicant’s
agreement to provide space on or near the wireless support
structure for authority or local governmental services at less than
the market rate for space or to provide other services via the
structure or facilities at less than the market rate for the
services;

(m) Limiting the duration of the approval of an application;

(n) Discriminating or creating a preference on the basis of the
ownership, including ownership by the authority, of any property,
structure, or tower when establishing rules or procedures for
siting wireless facilities or for evaluating applications;

(o) Imposing any requirements or obligations regarding the
presentation or appearance of facilities including, but not limited
to, those relating to the kind or type of materials used and those
relating to arranging, screening, or landscaping of facilities if
the requirements are unreasonable;

(p) Imposing any requirements that an applicant purchase,
subscribe to, use, or employ facilities, networks, or services
owned, provided, or operated by an authority, in whole or in part,
or by any entity in which an authority has a competitive, economic,
financial, governance, or other interest;

(q) Conditioning the approval of an application on, or otherwise
requiring, the applicant’s agreement to indemnify or insure the
authority in connection with the authority’s exercise of its police
power-based regulations; or

(r) Conditioning or requiring the approval of an application based
on the applicant’s agreement to permit any wireless facilities
provided or operated, in whole or in part, by an authority or by
any entity in which an authority has a competitive, economic,
financial, governance, or other interest, to be placed at or
connected to the applicant’s wireless support structure;

(2) Allows authorities to continue to exercise zoning, land use,
planning, and permitting authority within their territorial
boundaries with regard to the siting of new wireless support
structures, requirements, and with regard to applications for
substantial modifications of wireless support structures. The
authority must review, within 120 days of receiving an application
to construct a new wireless support structure or within the
additional time as may be mutually agreed to by an applicant and an
authority, the application as to its conformity with applicable
local zoning regulations and advise the applicant in writing of its
final decision to approve or disapprove the application.
Applications will include a copy of a lease or other agreement from
the property owner evidencing a right to pursue the application.
The authority must, within 120 days of receiving an application for
a substantial modification of wireless support structures, review
the application as to its conformity with applicable local zoning
regulations and advise the applicant in writing of its final
decision to approve or deny the application. Procedures for
extending these deadlines and fixing deficiencies are also
specified in the bill. A party aggrieved by the final action of an
authority or its inaction may bring an action for review in any
court of competent jurisdiction;

(3) Requires an application for additions to or replacement of
wireless facilities to be reviewed for compliance with applicable
building permit requirements. Applications will include a copy of
a lease or letter or agreement from the property owner evidencing
the applicant’s right to pursue the application. The authority
must, within 90 days, review the application as to its conformity
with applicable building permit requirements and consistency with
the provisions of the act and advise the applicant in writing of
its final decision to approve or deny the application. However,
procedures for expediting or extending the deadline and for fixing
deficiencies are also specified in the bill. With regard to
collocation applications the overall deadline is 45 days with
procedures for notification and remedy of deficiencies specified in
the bill;

(4) Specifies that the provisions of the bill do not authorize an
authority, except when acting solely in its capacity as a utility,
to mandate, require, or regulate the placement, modification, or
attachments of any new wireless facility on new, existing, or
replacement poles owned or operated by a utility or expand the
power of an authority to regulate any utility;

(5) Prohibits an authority from instituting a moratorium on the
permitting, construction, or issuance of approval of new wireless
support structures, substantial modifications of wireless support
structures, or attachments to existing facilities of wireless
communication infrastructure if the moratorium exceeds six months
and if no good cause is shown. A moratorium must not affect
pending applications;

(6) Prohibits an authority from charging a wireless service
provider or wireless infrastructure provider any rental, license,
or other fee to locate a wireless support structure on an
authority’s property in excess of the current market rates for
rental or use of similarly situated property. An authority may not
offer a lease or contract to use public lands to locate a wireless
support structure on an authority’s property that is less than 15
years in duration. A process for the resolution of any disputes
over fair market value lease payments using appraisers appointed by
both parties is also specified in the bill; and

(7) Prohibits applicants for wireless facility permits from having
the power of eminent domain or the right to compel any private or
public property owner, the Department of Conservation, or the
Department of Natural Resources to lease or sell property or locate
wireless facilities on existing structures.

Here is a link to the full text of the Bill:  CLICK HERE.

I know of no other enacted legislation so far reaching to exclude local participation in the wireless siting process.

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AT&T’s “Uniform Wireless Communications Infrasturcture Act” in Missouri

Missouri Coat of Arms
Missouri Coat of Arms

Salus AT&T suprema lex esto

The latest attempt by the wireless industry, and specifically AT&T, to bypass any rational zoning process, is in Missouri.

House Bill 331,  “[t]o repeal sections 67.1830, 67.1836, 67.1838, 67.1842, 392.415, 392.420, and 392.461, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof twenty-two new sections relating to telecommunications” is a massage land grab the likes of which have not been seen elsewhere.

The Bill, which flew through the state legislature and is now sitting on Governor Nixon’s desk, would effective deregulate wireless communications from any effective local review or public participation.

Yesterday (Sunday, June 16), the Kansas City Star newspaper’s editorial urged Governor Nixon to veto the bill, saying “As much as Missouri needs to encourage a robust technology infrastructure, the placement of towers shouldn’t run roughshod over the wishes of communities or property owners. Yet that’s exactly what a bill on Gov. Jay Nixon’s desk enables cellphone service providers to do.” “There is no evidence that cities and counties in Missouri were making it unduly difficult to erect towers. House Bill 331 is simply a proactive move by corporate interests to have their way.”  Read the entire editorial here.

The following is the legislature’s analysis of the bill as sent on to Governor Nixon.

SS HB 331 — UTILITIES

This bill changes the laws regarding infrastructure facilities deployment.

PUBLIC UTILITY RIGHT OF WAY PERMITS

The bill allows public utilities to have permit denials by political subdivisions heard in court if they believe a violation of existing law has occurred. Courts must act in an expedited manner by moving disputes over public right of way under Sections 67.1830 to 67.1848, RSMo, to the front of the docket. If a political subdivision does not act on a permit application within 31 days, then the application will be deemed approved. If a public utility has legally been granted access to a political subdivision’s right of way since August 28, 2001, they are not required to obtain a new permit.

UNIFORM WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT ACT

The bill establishes the Uniform Wireless Communications Infrastructure Deployment Act to encourage and streamline the deployment of broadband facilities and to help ensure that robust wireless communication services are available throughout Missouri. The bill:

(1)    Prohibits an authority as specified in the bill with jurisdiction over wireless communications infrastructure from taking specified actions that could result in a non-uniform market for wireless service in Missouri. The prohibition does not include state courts having jurisdiction over land use, planning, or zoning decisions made by an authority. The prohibitions include:

(a)    Requiring an applicant to submit information about or evaluate an applicant’s business decisions with respect to its designed service, customer demand for service, or quality of its service to or from a particular area or site;

(b)    Evaluating an application based on the availability of other potential locations for the placement of wireless support structures or wireless facilities including, without limitation, the option to add wireless infrastructure to existing facilities instead of constructing a new wireless support structure or for substantial modifications of a support structure or vice versa;

(c)    Dictating the type of wireless facilities, infrastructure, or technology to be used by the applicant by requiring an applicant to construct a distributed antenna system in lieu of constructing a new wireless support structure;

(d)    Requiring the removal of existing wireless support structures or wireless facilities, wherever located, as a condition for approval of an application;

(e)    Imposing environmental testing, sampling, or monitoring requirements or other compliance measures for radio frequency emissions on wireless facilities that are categorically excluded under the Federal Communications Commission’s rules for radio frequency emissions under 47 CFR 1.1307(b)(1) or other applicable federal law;

(f)    Establishing or enforcing regulations or procedures for RF signal strength or the adequacy of service quality;

(g)    Rejecting an application in conformance with 47 U.S.C. Section 332(c)(7)(b)(4), in whole or in part, based on perceived or alleged environmental effects of radio frequency emissions;

(h)    Imposing any restrictions with respect to objects in navigable airspace that are greater than or in conflict with the restrictions imposed by the Federal Aviation Administration;

(i)    Prohibiting the placement of emergency power systems that comply with federal and state environmental requirements;

(j)    Charging an application fee, consulting fee, or other fee associated with the submission, review, processing, and approval of an application that is not required for similar types of commercial development within the authority’s jurisdiction.   Fees imposed by an authority for or directly by a third-party entity providing review or technical consultation to the authority must be based on actual, direct, and reasonable administrative costs incurred for the review, processing, and approval of an application. In no case should total charges and fees exceed $500 for a collocation application or $1,500 for an application for a new wireless support structure or for a substantial modification of a wireless support structure. An entity with jurisdiction or any third-party entity cannot include within its charges any travel expenses incurred in a third-party’s review of an application, and in no event can an applicant be required to pay or reimburse an authority for consultation or other third-party fees based on a contingency or result-based arrangement;

(k)    Imposing surety requirements, including bonds, escrow

deposits, letters of credit, or any other type of financial surety, to ensure that abandoned or unused facilities can be removed unless the authority imposes similar requirements on other permits for other types of commercial development or land uses;

(l)    Conditioning the approval of an application on the applicant’s agreement to provide space on or near the wireless support structure for authority or local governmental services at less than the market rate for space or to provide other services via the structure or facilities at less than the market rate for the services;

(m)    Limiting the duration of the approval of an application;

(n)    Discriminating or creating a preference on the basis of the ownership, including ownership by the authority, of any property, structure, or tower when establishing rules or procedures for siting wireless facilities or for evaluating applications;

(o)    Imposing any requirements or obligations regarding the presentation or appearance of facilities including, but not limited to, those relating to the kind or type of materials used and those relating to arranging, screening, or landscaping of facilities if the requirements are unreasonable;

(p)    Imposing any requirements that an applicant purchase, subscribe to, use, or employ facilities, networks, or services owned, provided, or operated by an authority, in whole or in part, or by any entity in which an authority has a competitive, economic, financial, governance, or other interest;

(q)    Conditioning the approval of an application on, or otherwise requiring, the applicant’s agreement to indemnify or insure the authority in connection with the authority’s exercise of its police power-based regulations; or

(r)    Conditioning or requiring the approval of an application based on the applicant’s agreement to permit any wireless facilities provided or operated, in whole or in part, by an authority or by any entity in which an authority has a competitive, economic, financial, governance, or other interest, to be placed at or connected to the applicant’s wireless support structure;

(2)    Allows authorities to continue to exercise zoning, land use, planning, and permitting authority within their territorial boundaries with regard to the siting of new wireless support structures, requirements, and with regard to applications for substantial modifications of wireless support structures.  The authority must review, within 120 days of receiving an application to construct a new wireless support structure or within the additional time as may be mutually agreed to by an applicant and an authority, the application as to its conformity with applicable local zoning regulations and advise the applicant in writing of its final decision to approve or disapprove the application. Applications will include a copy of a lease or other agreement from the property owner evidencing a right to pursue the application. The authority must, within 120 days of receiving an application for a substantial modification of wireless support structures, review the application as to its conformity with applicable local zoning regulations and advise the applicant in writing of its final decision to approve or deny the application. Procedures for extending these deadlines and fixing deficiencies are also specified in the bill. A party aggrieved by the final action of an authority or its inaction may bring an action for review in any court of competent jurisdiction;

(3)    Requires an application for additions to or replacement of wireless facilities to be reviewed for compliance with applicable building permit requirements. Applications will include a copy of a lease or letter or agreement from the property owner evidencing the applicant’s right to pursue the application.   The authority must, within 90 days, review the application as to its conformity with applicable building permit requirements and consistency with the provisions of the act and advise the applicant in writing of its final decision to approve or deny the application.   However, procedures for expediting or extending the deadline and for fixing deficiencies are also specified in the bill. With regard to collocation applications the overall deadline is 45 days with procedures for notification and remedy of deficiencies specified in the bill;

(4)    Specifies that the provisions of the bill do not authorize an authority, except when acting solely in its capacity as a utility, to mandate, require, or regulate the placement, modification, or attachments of any new wireless facility on new, existing, or replacement poles owned or operated by a utility or expand the power of an authority to regulate any utility;

(5)    Prohibits an authority from instituting a moratorium on the permitting, construction, or issuance of approval of new wireless support structures, substantial modifications of wireless support structures, or attachments to existing facilities of wireless communication infrastructure if the moratorium exceeds six months and if no good cause is shown. A moratorium must not affect pending applications;

(6)    Prohibits an authority from charging a wireless service provider or wireless infrastructure provider any rental, license, or other fee to locate a wireless support structure on an authority’s property in excess of the current market rates for rental or use of similarly situated property. An authority may not offer a lease or contract to use public lands to locate a wireless support structure on an authority’s property that is less than 15 years in duration. A process for the resolution of any disputes over fair market value lease payments using appraisers appointed by both parties is also specified in the bill; and

(7)    Prohibits applicants for wireless facility permits from having the power of eminent domain or the right to compel any private or public property owner, the Department of Conservation, or the Department of Natural Resources to lease or sell property or locate wireless facilities on existing structures.

RAILROAD FACILITY UTILITY CROSSINGS

The bill establishes procedures for utilities regulated by the Missouri Public Service Commission or rural electric cooperatives, municipal utilities, and specified nonprofit electrical corporations in third classification counties, to construct a facility as specified in the bill through a railroad right-of-way.

The bill specifies that a utility must be deemed to have authorization to commence a crossing activity 30 days from the mailing of the notice, completing the engineering specifications, and payment of the fee, absent a claim of special circumstances. The utility may propose an amended crossing proposal if special circumstances exist.     The land management company and the utility must maintain and repair its own property within the railroad right-of-way and bear responsibility for its own acts and omissions, except that the utility must be responsible for any bodily injury or property damage that typically would be covered under a standard railroad protective liability insurance policy.  A utility must have immediate access to a crossing for repair and maintenance of existing facilities in case of emergency. Applicable engineering standards must be complied with for utility facilities crossing railroad rights-of-way.    The engineering specifications must address the applicable clearance requirements as established by the National Electrical Safety Code and the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Way Association.

Unless otherwise agreed by the parties and subject to Section 389.588, a utility that locates its facilities within the railroad right-of-way for a crossing, other than a crossing along a state highway, must pay the land management company a one-time standard crossing fee of $1500 for each crossing plus the costs associated with modifications to existing insurance contracts of the land management company. The standard crossing fee must be in lieu of any license, permit, application, plan review, or any other fees or charges to reimburse the land management company for direct expenses incurred by the land management company as a result of the crossing. The utility must also reimburse the land management company for any actual flagging expenses associated with a crossing in addition to the standard crossing fee.

The provisions of the bill cannot prevent a land management company and a utility from otherwise negotiating the terms and conditions applicable to a crossing or the resolution of any disputes relating to the crossing and cannot impair the authority of a utility to secure crossing rights by easement through the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

If a utility and land management company cannot agree that special circumstances exist regarding a particular crossing, the dispute must be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the commercial rules of arbitration in the American Arbitration Association.  However, each party may also pursue relief in a court of proper jurisdiction and the winning side must be awarded attorney fees. If a dispute involves only compensation associated with a crossing, the utility may proceed with the installation of a crossing while the arbitration is pending.

The bill does not modify any power of condemnation or grant the exercise of eminent domain power to any entity.

The provisions of the bill apply to a crossing commenced prior to August 28, 2013, if an agreement concerning the crossing has expired or is terminated and to a crossing commenced on or after August 28, 2013.

EMERGENCY INFORMATION REQUESTS

The bill provides immunity from suit for providers of communication related services for providing information to law enforcement officials or agencies under Section 392.415.

PRICE CAP WAIVERS

The bill allows specified telecommunications companies that are currently regulated by the Missouri Public Service Commission and have maximum price caps to seek a waiver from the commission for the price cap regulations in the same manner waivers are currently granted for other rules and regulations.

MISCELLANEOUS TELECOMMUNICATION PROVISIONS

The bill also makes the following changes to telecommunication regulations:

(1)    Allows a telecommunications company to include any, all, or none of its rates for any, all, or none of its retail services in a tariff filed with the commission;

(2)    Exempts specified telecommunications companies that hold a state charter or are licensed to do business under Chapter 392 from most rules and regulations relating to the retail services under Chapter 386, except the companies may voluntarily comply with the commission’s orders, rules, or statutes by notifying the commission. Telecommunications companies are still required to collect the universal service fund surcharge; report the intrastate telecommunications service revenues necessary to calculate the commission assessment, universal service fund surcharge, and telecommunications programs under Section 209.255; and comply with the emergency location requirements;

(3)    Exempts broadband and other Internet protocol-enabled services from the regulations under Chapters 386 and 392 except that voice over Internet protocol services must comply with the fees and registration requirements enforced by the commission under Section 392.550;

(4)    Specifies that the commission retains jurisdiction over all matters delegated to it by federal law and the bill does not modify these duties in any way; and

(5)    Allows telecommunications companies to register with the commission and obtain certification using the same process as used for voice over Internet protocol service under Section 392.550.3.

Click here for the full text of HB 331.

If Governor Nixon signs this legislation into lex, the existing Missouri state motto “Salus populi suprema lex esto” should change to “Salus AT&T suprema lex esto”.

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Going to Deny a Site in Nebraska? Better Do it Right.

US District Judge Richard Kopf has, again, set out the minimum ‘in writing’ and ‘substantial evidence’ standards for a Nebraska local government intending to deny a wireless site application.

On December 23, 2010, Judge Kopf granted a motion for summary judgment sought by Viaero Wireless to require the Village of Doniphan, Nebraska to issue the required permits to permit Viaero to construct a new wireless site within the Village.

Viaero argued that the Doniphan Board of Trustees’ denial of its CUP application violated § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) of the TCA because the Board’s decision was not in writing or supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.  Judge Kopf agreed.

In his decision, Judge Kopf cited the facts from the record:

During its regular monthly meeting on February 8, 2010, the Doniphan Board of Trustees considered and held a public hearing to receive public comment on Viaero’s CUP application. A Viaero representative attended the meeting and made a Power Point presentation to the Board in support of Viaero’s CUP application. The representative also answered questions posed to him from both the Board and various citizens attending the meeting.   No motion was made to approve the application and no action was taken to approve or deny the application at that meeting.   With respect to the CUP application, the  February 8, 2010 meeting minutes only state:

The Public Hearing to receive public comment on a conditional use permit application from Viaero Wireless to construct a wireless communication tower in the 200/300 block of North First Street opened at 8:00 p.m. Chris Riha, Site Acquisition Manager with Viaero Wireless gave a power point presentation detailing plans for the tower, and its location. He also addressed common concerns with this type of structure and answered questions. There were several residents and property owners of the Village who were present for the discussion. The 80 foot self supporting lattice tower would be located to the north and east of White Farms Trucking and is needed in order to improve cell phone coverage for customers in the Doniphan area. The tower would be surrounded by a chain link fence housing a back up generator, a buried 1,000 gallon propane tank and an aggregate building to store the electronic equipment. The Board heard numerous concerns and comments from members of the public in opposition to the tower’s location, which is near a residential district. The overall feeling from the public was that the tower needed to be moved away from the housing area to a more suitable location. After a lengthy discussion the Public Hearing closed at 9:36 p.m. Chairman Treat then called for a motion to approve the Conditional Use Permit application from Viaero Wireless to construct a wireless communication tower in the 200/300 block of North First Street. No such motion was made, therefore no action was taken by the Board and the Conditional Use Permit was not approved.

Viaero’s CUP application was again considered by the Doniphan Board of Trustees at a meeting held on March 8, 2010. No additional testimony on Viaero’s application was taken by the Board at that meeting. However, one of the trustees made a motion to deny the application. That motion was seconded and passed unanimously. There was no discussion by the Board of any reason for denying the application. The Board’s minutes for its March 8, 2010 meeting say only, “[a] motion was then made by Jenkins, seconded by Haile to deny the Conditional Use Permit Application from Viaero Wireless. Motion carried unanimously.”

(Internal citations omitted)

Judge Kopf explained:

The TCA requires that “[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). In USOC of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, Nebraska, 279 F. Supp.2d 1080, 1084-85 (2003), a case with facts similar to those presented here, I concluded that in order for a decision by a local government denying a request to place, construct or modify personal wireless facilities to be “in writing” for purposes of this section of the TCA, it must: “(1) be separate from the written record; (2) describe the reasons for the denial; and (3) contain a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record that supports those reasons.” Id. at 1084-85 (2003) (quoting New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2002)). The Doniphan Board of Trustees’ decision denying Viaero’s CUP application is insufficient under this standard.

The decision to deny Viaero’s application is only noted in the minutes of the March 8, 2010 Board meeting. As was the case in USOC of Greater Iowa, these meeting minutes merely reflect that the application was unanimously denied. The minutes do not contain stated reasons for the denial or an explanation of how the decision was reached. [The Village] argues that the combination of the meeting minutes from the March 8, 2010 meeting and the February 8, 2010 meeting satisfy the “in writing” requirement. The court disagrees. While the February 8, 2010 minutes give some general indication as to what evidence was presented at the hearing, there is no explanation as to why the Board ultimately denied the application.

Defendant urges the court to reconsider its decision in USOC of Greater Iowa and find that any decision that is “in writing,” including a decision reflected in written meeting minutes, should be held to satisfy the “in writing” requirement contemplated by the TCA. The court declines to do so. As I concluded in USOC of Greater Iowa, “permitting local boards to issue written denials that give no reasons for a decision would frustrate meaningful judicial review, even where the written record may offer some guidance as to the board’s rationale.” USOC of Greater Iowa, 279 F. Supp.2d at 1084 (quoting Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)). This reasoning remains sound. Without a decision adequately explaining the reasons for the denial, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting the reasons for the denial.

Further, even assuming that the “in writing” requirement was satisfied, the Board’s decision would nevertheless violate the TCA because it is not “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii.) “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” USOC of Greater Iowa, 279 F. Supp.2d at 1085 (quoting Mississippi Transp. Inc. v. NLRB, 33 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 1994)).

Further, even assuming that the “in writing” requirement was satisfied, the Board’s decision would nevertheless violate the TCA because it is not “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii.)
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” USOC of Greater Iowa, 279 F. Supp.2d at 1085 (quoting Mississippi Transp. Inc. v. NLRB, 33 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 1994)).

Under the substantial evidence standard we cannot substitute our determination for that of the administrative fact-finder just because we believe that the fact-finder is clearly wrong. If the Board’s findings are supported by some substantial level of evidence (but less than a preponderance) on the record as a whole (contrary evidence may not simply be ignored on review) so that a reasonable fact-finder could reach the same conclusion as did the Board, the Board’s decision must be affirmed. We will not reject the Board’s decision as unsupported by substantial evidence because there exists the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions for the evidence.

Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Platte County, Missouri, 578 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting USCOC of Greater Iowa v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 465 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2006) ).

Defendant contends that substantial evidence supporting Defendant’s decision is contained in the minutes from the Board meeting held on February 8, 2010. In particular, Defendant points to the minutes’ reference to numerous public concerns and comments in opposition to the tower’s proposed location, which is near a residential district. With respect to these “public concerns,” the meeting minutes only state that “[t]he overall feeling from the public was that the tower needed to be moved away from the housing area to a more suitable location.” (Filing 24-3 at CM/ECF p.2. ) While public concerns can, in some instances, serve as substantial evidence, layperson residents’ generalized comments about aesthetics and property values are insufficient and, from the record presented here, there is no way of determining what the precise citizen concerns were. See USOC of Greater Iowa, 279 F. Supp.2d at 1086 (finding that generalized property value concerns by laypersons are insubstantial); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that “generalized expressions of concern with ‘aesthetics’ cannot serve as substantial evidence” for denying a permit); Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that generalized concerns about property values and visual impact does not constitute substantial evidence). Moreover, there is no evidence that Viaero’s CUP application was denied based on the public comments referenced in the meeting minutes. There simply is no substantial evidence in a written record to support the Board’s decision.

Substantial evidence in the record, and written decisions based on the substantial evidence…  The formalities count, and Judge Kopf has confirmed that once again.

Case No. 4:10-cv-03059

viaero.wireless.complaint

viaero.wireless.answer

viaero.wireless.decision

viaero.wireless.order

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